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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
TO SEPARATIST CLAIMS:
ARE DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLES RELEVANT?
DIANE F. ORENTLICHER

Although a perennial feature of global politics, separatist movements had scant prospect of success for nearly half a century after
World War II. And so the recent proliferation of new states has shattered settled expectations. In the 1990s, Yugoslavia fractured into
five states, the Soviet Union split into fifteen, Eritrea separated
from Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia divided into the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, and East Timor won independence from Indonesia.
The success of breakaway movements from Slovenia to Eritrea has
given new impetus to a raft of other separatists across the globe.'
And small wonder: the surge in state making in the 1990s marked
a new departure. 2 Outside the context of decolonization, international law has long regarded separatist claims with disfavor. To be
sure, international law and state practice remain deeply skeptical of
separatist movements; few are likely to succeed. Even so, the recent
success of several signifies the possibility of a broader realignment
of law and policy.
An important barometer of change has been the nature of
diplomatic responses to contested separatist claims. The breakup
of the former Yugoslavia drew mediation efforts by the European
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Community (EC), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, the United Nations, the five-nation Contact Group, and, finally, the United States. These and other mediation efforts have
been shaped by and in turn are reshaping international law concerning recognition of new states.' With relevant principles now in
flux, the question today is, What principles should guide international responses to separatist claims?
In this essay I explore an aspect of this question that has recently
assumed special importance-the relevance of democratic principles. By focusing on this question, I do not mean to suggest that
principles of self-government are the only-or even the most important-values that should be brought to bear in assessing separatist claims. Far from it. For good reason, concerns relating to international security and stability, as well as a core commitment to
the territorialintegrity of states, have long dominated international
law's bias against separatist movements. That same bias is reinforced by the humanitarian aims of international law, whose antipathy toward ethnic separatism can be captured in a simple syllogism: If national groups enjoyed a presumptive right to statehood,
national minorities would inevitably be captured within the boundaries of another nation's state-and would be vulnerable to repression. Equally important, postwar human rights law is imbued with
the values of civic nationalism, which conceives citizenship not in
terms of ethnic or national identity but in terms of equal protection
of all citizens before a common law and shared institutions of governance.
Even so, recent developments in legal doctrine and state practice make clear, as I contend in the next section, that principles of
self-government have already become relevant, both legally and
practically, to the resolution of contested separatist claims. Much
less clear, however, is the question I address in this essay: What, precisely, are the implications of democratic principles for assessments
of separatist claims?
I.

THE TRAJECTORY OF "SELF-DETERMINATION"

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although this question has at times loomed large in political theory
and state practice, it has only lately become a substantial issue of in-
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ternational law. To appreciate the significance of this development,
it is helpful briefly to recall how international law has treated separatist claims in the past.
A. The InterwarPeriod
The law governing separatist movements before World War I can be
briefly stated: once a national movement secured independence,
other states would acknowledge the established facts of statehood.
International law did not, however, regard any type of self-determination claim as legitimate ex ante.
The Paris Peace Conference marked a significant, if limited, departure from the classic view. Although not yet considered a legal
right, self-determination was a guiding principle for statesmen who
remapped central and eastern Europe following World War I. To
the extent consistent with other objectives, they gave effect to the
"principle of nationalities": the boundaries of new and reconfigured states were to be drawn along national lines. The peacemakers also gave limited effect to another conception of self-determination, which supports the resolution of key political questionsincluding core questions of statehood-through democratic
processes. For example, the fate of certain disputed territories, including Upper Silesia and Schleswig, would be determined by internationally supervised plebiscites.
It remained to be seen whether a general principle of law would
emerge from the foundation laid at Versailles or whether, instead,
the Peace Conference would remain a case-specific exercise of
Great Power diplomacy. The answer came quickly. A proposal by
Woodrow Wilson to incorporate the principle of self-determination
in the Covenant of the League of Nations 4 was defeated.
If there was any lingering doubt about the legal status of "self-determination," it was put to rest in the reports of two commissions
appointed by the League of Nations in connection with a dispute
over the status of the Aaland Islands.5 Both bodies concluded that
international law did not recognize a right of national self-determination.' But their reports hinted at possible exceptions in circumstances implicating the rights of minorities. Most explicitly, the
Commission of Rapporteurs suggested that secession might be
available as a "last resort when the State lacks either the will or the
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power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees" of minority
rights.7
The Aaland Islands remained in Finland, where their inhabitants now enjoy substantial autonomy. But the concept of remedial
secession hinted at by the Commission of Rapporteurs continues to
resonate in legal doctrine and political philosophy. As elaborated
in the section that follows, in more recent incarnations the notion
of a remedial right to secede has expanded to include situations in
which a defined subpopulation is persistently excluded from full
political participation.
B. PostwarLaw: Decolonization
In the postwar period, self-determination was transformed from a
principle into a legal right. With this, its meaning also changed.
Now self-determination meant the right of colonized peoples freely
to determine their political status. For a time, this meant that the
postwar right of self-determination would have scant relevance beyond the context of decolonization. But in the view of many commentators, this generalization has long been subject to a key qualification: groups persistently denied meaningful participation in national political processes might be entitled to secede.
This view derives above all from the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations ("Declaration on Friendly Relations"), adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 1970.8 The declaration made clear that the
core meaning of the principle of self-determination enshrined in
the UN Charter was the right of "the people of a colony or non-selfgoverning territory" freely to determine its political status.9 Outside
the special context of decolonization, established states would
enjoy the right to territorial integrity. But the declaration famously
hinted that this right might be forfeited if a state's government did
not represent "the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.""'
This language has been interpreted implicitly to confer the right
of self-determination, exceptionally entailing secession, "only on
racialor religiousgroups living in a sovereign State which are denied
access to the political decision-making process; linguisticor national
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groups do not have a concomitant right" (italics in original)." But
recent iterations of the principle enunciated in the Declaration on
Friendly Relations have removed its restrictive terms. Where the
1970 declaration affirms the right of territorial integrity with respect to states whose government represents "the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or
colour," UN declarations of 1990s vintage affirm the same right
with respect to states "possessed of a Government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any
kind" (italics added).' The Supreme Court of Canada has characterized views to the effect that these instruments support an exceptional right of secession this way: "[W]hen a people is blocked from
the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally,
it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession."" In this
view, secession is a remedy of final recourse that may come into play
when it is the sole means by which a substate group can exercise its
right of political participation on a basis of equality.
This view rests upon an implied assertion: everyone is entitled to
participate, on a basis of full equality, in the political life of his or
her nation. When the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Friendly Relations in 1970, this claim was the sort of bromide from which few, if any, states would publicly dissent. But outside the special context of global concern with apartheid and decolonization, states were not prepared to back up this claim with
the sanction of legal entitlement. And so any corollary right of secession had much the same force as a resolution proclaiming a definitive determination of the number of angels who could dance on
the head of a pin. In this setting, there was scant reason for practitioners of statecraft to wrestle with the vexing questions bound up
in a remedial right of secession: What manner of inequality in the
exercise of political rights would justify remedial secession? How
persistent must the shortcoming be? Are there measures short of
secession that must be exhausted before the last-resort remedy can
plausibly be claimed?
C. The Democratic Entitlement
But in the last decade of the twentieth century, the implied claim
underlying the asserted last-resort remedy of secession-that
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everyone is entitled to participate, on a basis of equality, in self-government-gathered substantial support.' 4 In addition to its external dimension, we were reminded, self-determination has an internal dimension, embodied above all in principles of democratic governance.' 5
This aspect of the right to self-determination received unprecedented attention beginning in the 1990s, but its core claim was already established in two widely ratified treaties. Common Article 1
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' and of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights' 7 asserts the right of "[ajll peoples" to self-determination.
The drafting history and text make clear that, while this provision
encompasses the familiar right of peoples living under colonial
rule to attain independence, 8 it has an internal dimension as
well.
Even so, rights relating to democratic government did not occupy a significant place in the domain of statecraft until recently.
Now they occupy a pride of place. "Democracy," Thomas Franck
wrote in 1992, "is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one
that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes." 20 The emerging law, Franck argued, "requires democracy to validate governance."21
The evidence supporting Franck's claim was impressive in 1992
and has become even stronger. In 1994, for example, the UN Security Council authorized a military intervention in Haiti for the
express purpose of restoring "the legitimately elected President,"
who had been deposed in a coup.2 2 These and other developments
signal an unprecedented commitment by states to principles of
democracy.
In the remainder of this essay, I explore the implications of that
commitment for separatist movements. First, it might be helpful to
highlight two possibilities latent in the preceding account of international law and state practice. One builds upon the plebiscite
principle applied by statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference. The
future status of several disputed territories, it will be recalled, was
put to a vote of the territories' inhabitants. This conception of selfdetermination naturally raises vexing issues, which I want to set
aside for now. Here I simply wish to note that diplomatic practice
has at times affirmed the view that contested territorial claims
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should be resolved through a particular type of democratic process,

balloting.
The second possibility latent in established legal doctrine is that
a general right to democratic governance carries with it the right of
a national subgroup to secede if this is the only means available to
secure its members' right to self-government. In this view, secession
is not a general entitlement for any particular type of collectivity
but rather an extraordinary exception to the universal right of selfgovernment. The latter right is conceived in terms that contemplate full realization within established states and not through
withdrawal from them-except, that is, as a last-resort remedy.
In sum, then, international law has long disfavored separatist
claims. But alongside this general disapproval, international instruments and other relevant sources have long reserved a possible
exception: implicit in international law's core commitment to basic
human rights and democratic principles is recognition of a last-resort, remedial right for a subnational group to secede when these
rights are denied its members.23

II.

DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND SEPARATIST CLAIMS

A.

The Relevance of DemocraticPrinciples
in Assessing Separatist Claims

Apart from the two possibilities just noted, to which I shall return
later, does the international community's newly invigorated commitment to democracy have implications for separatist claims?24
For many political and legal theorists, the answer is unambiguously
"no." Questions of boundary, it is often said, stand wholly outside
theories of democratic government.25
But this seems plainly wrong. An appeal to common sense suggests why. Suppose that, instead of opposing Quebec separatists,
the rest of Canada overwhelmingly voted in support of their claim.
In this counterfactual, Canadians outside Quebec simply would not
wish to be politically yoked to Quebec any longer. Suppose also that
a vast majority of Quebec's citizens, including all of its significant
minority populations, voted for secession. If, with Professor Franck,
we believe that an emerging body of international law "requires
democracy to validate governance," most of us would conclude that
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the mutual desire of Canada's citizens to divide should be honored-perhaps must be honored-in the absence of overriding
considerations.
We may not readily agree, however, on the reasons behind this
intuition. For some, the key point may be that, like any issue that
has a significant impact on our lives and that therefore seems an appropriate subject of self-government, questions of boundary ought
to be subject to democratic determination if they become substantial subjects of dispute. For others, a deeper principle may be at
stake-the consent of "the people" to be governed by the political
authority that exercises sovereign power over them. As Jamin
Raskin has written, "[T]he very heart of the democratic idea" is
"that governmental legitimacy depends upon the affirmative consent of those who are governed." 5 If, then, every substantial sector
of Canadian society supported the independence of Quebec, this
core principle might seem to be violated with respect to all of
them-Quebecers and other Canadians-if they were forced to remain co-citizens.
Although its implications may seem radical, the second view is
hardly novel. For some eighteenth-century nationalists-the intellectual progenitors of the emerging democratic entitlement-it
seemed obvious that the right to self-government implied the right
to choose one's fellow citizens.27 The point seemed equally plain to
John Stuart Mill. Affirming that "the question of government ought
to be decided by the governed," Mill continued: "One hardly knows
what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to
determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves."2
Again, an appeal to common sense clarifies the claim. It has
long been settled that alien states may not lawfully impose their
rule upon nonconsenting peoples. Put differently, international
law no longer abides colonization or forcible annexation. But if
these forms of nonconsensual rule cannot be reconciled with principles inherent in the right of self-determination, surely those same
principles are challenged by a state's continued assertion of sovereignty over a defined population that has unambiguously rejected
its authority. For if a significant, territorially bounded, national
subgroup unambiguously expresses its will to secede, the legiti-
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macy of the state's sovereignty over the rebel population is placed
in question.29
The bald claim that democratic principles are beside the point
in these circumstances seems to rest on several false assumptions.
One is that to recognize the relevance of democratic principles in
assessing separatist claims is to open up the boundaries of established states to perennial challenge. Yet the assumption that citizens provide ongoing, if tacit, consent to the boundaries of their
state underpins the daily practice of democracy.
A more substantial fallacy is to equate the view that democratic
principles may be relevant in judging separatist claims with the
manifestly untenable claim that the will of any and every group that
challenges established boundaries is entitled to prevail over that of
others. The claim that principles of self-government may have implications for the resolution of boundary disputes does not imply
that democratic values generallyprivilege separatist claims.
Earlier, I tried to make the point that an emerging democratic
entitlement may have significant implications for separatist claims
by invoking the proverbial easy case, a hypothetical situation in
which all affected citizens would support such a claim. But few cases
are easy; most separatist claims are contested. In this respect, the situation involving the Serbian province of Kosovo is typical: although
a majority of Kosovars favor independence, most citizens of Serbia,
including the minority Serb population in Kosovo, oppose independence for Kosovo. Plainly, in situations where the will of the affected polity is divided, democratic theories do not neatly dispose
of contested separatist claims.
Even so, theories of democratic government point to considerations that may be relevant to the legitimacy and resolution of contested separatist claims, in part because some resolutions may promote democratic values better than others. By way of illustration,
let us briefly consider the implications of two strands of democratic
theory, utilitarianism and republicanism.
A utilitarian justification for democracy claims that self-government is more likely than its alternatives to secure the interests of the
greatest number of persons subject to governmental authority. For
eighteenth-century utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and James
Mill, democracy was desirable not as an end in itself but as a means
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for maximizing the realization of individuals' desires through the
aggregation of private preferences. But this justification may begin
to fray if a polity is divided along fault lines that entail profound differences in political choices.0
Under some conditions the republican tradition may also offer
support for separatist claims-or at least it may seem to at the
proverbial first blush. More particularly, values central to republicanism might be furthered by political divorce resulting in two or
more states whose citizens were significantly better able than citizens of the previous, unified state to consider the common good in
their democratic deliberations. Core principles of republicanism
include citizen participation in the deliberative process, made possible by civic virtue; the equality of political actors; and a commitment to the common interest or good. Republicanism not only
tolerates but assumes some measure of diversity within the self-governing polity. As Cass Sunstein has written, republicanism rests on
"a belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue" and sees disagreement as a creative force that
promotes political deliberation. 2 Through deliberation, initial
preferences change and political outcomes promote a common
good rather than the preferences of the majority alone. This requires not only "a commitment to political empathy, embodied in
a requirement that political actors attempt to assume the position
of those who disagree," 3 but also the ability to empathize with citizens whose interests are different than one's own. That capacity
may be in short supply, however, when disagreements among citizens are rooted in profoundly different group identities. 4
Similar considerations led John Stuart Mill to conclude that "it
is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the
boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those
of nationalities."5 Indeed, the capacity to empathize was central to
Mill's conception of nations: "A portion of mankind may be said to
constitute a Nationality," Mill wrote, "if they are united among
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between
them and any others-which make them co-operate with each
other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the
same government, and desire that it should be government by
themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively." 6
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There is no reason to suppose, however, that republicanism tends to
favor separatist claims. Like other visions of democracy, republican
principles are consistent with arrangements designed to resolve
fundamental disagreements among disparate groups of citizens
without changing national borders. Democratic institutions can
be-and often have been-designed to foster interethnic accommodation within the boundaries of established states through such
institutional devices as proportional representation and powersharing arrangements.
So far I have tried to show how democratic principles might be
relevant in assessing separatist claims through examples that may
favor those seeking separation. And so I want to make clear that, in
my view, democratic principles would be thwarted by a rule of international law generally favoring independence for state-seeking
groups."7 To begin, the very possibility of secession may subvert
democratic deliberation by diminishing incentives for opposing
groups to seek accommodative solutions. When secession is believed possible, minorities can distort the outcome of political
processes by threatening to secede if their views do not prevail. 8
And as Abraham Lincoln argued, if a secessionist movement opposed by a majority of a state's citizens ultimately prevailed, its triumph would vitiate the principle of majority rule. 9
Further, to the extent that separatist claims are fueled by nationalist sentiment, their success may result in the creation of states
prone toward authoritarian social arrangements. Lord Acton had
this in mind when he warned: "In a small and homogeneous population there is hardly room .. .for inner groups of interests that set
bounds to sovereign power."4 0 In his view, the multiethnic state
"provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of
a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations."" If, with Locke, we believe that the principle of self-government follows from the intrinsic and equal worth of people, the authoritarian arrangements associated with ethnonational states imperil core values that democracy is meant to secure.
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B. DemocraticProcessesfor Resolving

Contested Separatist Claims
My argument so far has aimed at supporting a modest claim-that
states' newly robust commitment to democracy has significant implications for separatist claims, even if those implications cannot be
captured in a simplistic formula prescribing a uniform approach to
all state-seeking movements. To illustrate, I have noted various ways
in which democratic values might appear to favor one or another
potential outcome of disputes arising out of separatist claims. Thus
far, however, I have not addressed the distinct question of how
these largely substantive considerations might be brought to bear
in practice. The answer is hardly self-evident; after all, there is no
standing body entrusted with the task of assessing separatist claims
that might usefully be guided by the considerations explored in the
previous section. Nor does my previous analysis touch on the related question of whether principles of democracy have more direct implications for the processes used to resolve disputes surrounding separatist claims. It is to these questions that I now turn.
My point of departure is the claim that, under virtually any vision
of democracy, achieving a mutually consensual outcome is the preferred way to resolve disputes over separatist claims. In a utilitarian
calculus, for example, a mutually consensual outcome suggests that
the political preferences of all major segments of a divided polity
have been realized to a degree that is acceptable to each of them.
A mutually accepted outcome also affirms the republican faith in
citizens' capacity to resolve their differences through dialogue
aimed at promoting the common good. Thus democratic values, as
well as other central commitments of international law, are best
served when separatist claims are resolved through negotiation
rather than by unilateral fiat.
Democratic values are placed in special peril when secession is
accomplished without any meaningful input, through balloting or
otherwise, by citizens left behind by successful separatist movements. In these circumstances citizens would be significantly-perhaps profoundly-affected by a decision in which they had no opportunity to participate.` Indeed, secession has at times had a
tragic impact on groups stranded in the rump state. The effect of
Croatia's and Slovenia's secession from the Socialist Federal Re-
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public of Yugoslavia (SFRY) exemplifies the point. Until the two
former SFRY republics seceded in 1991, multiethnic Bosnia and
Hercegovina had no interest in seeking independence. To the contrary, it had a strong interest in preserving Yugoslav unity. With no
ethnic group forming a majority in Bosnia, its Muslim and Croat citizens feared for their welfare in a diminished Yugoslavia that did
not include Croatia, while most Bosnian Serbs wished to remain attached to Serbia. Apprehensions about Bosnia's fate in a rump Yugoslavia proved to be justified, as I elaborate shortly. On the other
hand, if the consent of all substantial substate groups were required
before secession was allowed, any group opposing a proposed
change in borders could block secession, even when separation
would be the most prudent or democratically legitimate outcome
of a dispute.
A commitment to address disputes over separatist claims
through negotiated agreement entails two corollary claims. The
first is that the negotiating partners must accept the possibility of
secession as an outcome of their negotiations. The second is that,
in general, disputes over separatist claims should not be resolved
solely by plebiscite. If a contested separatist claim were resolved by
balloting alone, the losing side would be governed by a political authority that it had avowedly rejected.44
Balloting may, however, play a legitimate role in resolving disputes within a broader context of negotiations. For example, an
overwhelming vote in support of secession by residents of a specific
region might be an appropriate way to trigger negotiations with
other citizens of the state. A referendum might also be a valid
mechanism for resolving disputes over separatist claims if the contending parties agreed in the course of negotiations to hold a referendum and accept its results. In the second situation, the result
of balloting would represent a mutually accepted outcome. For
similar reasons, balloting leading to political divorce would prima
facie enjoy democratic legitimacy if the national constitution explicitly provided for secession under the conditions followed in the
balloting process, assuming the constitution was adopted in a democratically legitimate fashion.
The Supreme Court of Canada took essentially the approach
I have just outlined in a 1998 advisory opinion on the question
whether Quebec had a unilateral right to secede. The Court
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concluded that a clear expression of the democratic will of Quebecers to secede, presumably through a referendum, would confer legitimacy on their quest-though not a right to secede unilaterally.45
In the Court's view, Canada's constitutional commitment to federalism and democracy had crucial implications for separatist claims:
The federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle, dictates that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province would give rise to a reciprocal
obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate constitutional
changes to respond to that desire. . . . The corollary of a legitimate
attempt by one participant in Confederation to seek an amendment
to the Constitution is an obligation on all parties to come to the negotiating table. The clear repudiation by the people of Quebec of
the existing constitutional order would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other provinces
and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them in accordance with the underlying principles already
discussed.46

Invoking the same constitutional values that informed this conclusion, the Court held that Quebec "could not purport to invoke a
right of self-determination such as to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties." 7
At the heart of the Court's analysis is its vision of democracy as a
deliberative process-a project in which profound differences
within the national polity are resolved not through a winner-takeall, one-time vote but through democratic negotiations. This approach provides an appealing strategy for addressing one of the
central problems presented by contested separatist claims-the impossibility of satisfying one group's aspirations without thwarting
the will of others.48
Assuming that the conditions surrounding a separatist bid have
not deteriorated to the point where genuine dialogue is impossible, the success of negotiations may turn in part on the institutional
context in which they are pursued. In some countries, that context
is defined by relevant constitutional provisions. With respect to others, intergovernmental bodies may provide the principal frame-
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work for seeking peaceful resolution of boundary disputes. While it
is beyond the scope of this essay to explore questions of institutional design in depth, several overarching principles can be derived from the previous discussion.
Ideally, negotiations over disputes relating to separatist claims
should be carried out within a framework that simultaneously (1)
builds in strong incentives for mutual accommodation, (2) minimizes the risk of deadlock, and (3) presents significant hurdles to
secession. The first two interrelated goals are implicit in the goal of
fostering mutually accepted outcomes. A key challenge in this regard is to ensure that one side cannot readily preclude a mutually
acceptable outcome through intransigence. At the same time, an
effective institutional design for negotiations must be able to address situations in which it is not possible to achieve a mutually accepted result, particularly where the very survival of a group is
gravely imperiled.
While the third goal-erecting hurdles to secession-serves the
same interests as the first two, it also provides insurance against the
specter of political divorce resulting, at least in substantial part,
from fortuitous political forces. This sort of risk is exemplified in
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The negotiations that culminated in the division of Czechoslovakia initially were aimed at working out the allocation of power between the central government
and the two constituent republics, though the focus of negotiations
evolved significantly.49 The course of negotiations was profoundly
shaped by the two republics' diverging approaches on economic
policy 50 and by the personalities of their respective leaders. 5 1 Importantly, too, the negotiations played out within a constitutional
framework that fostered deadlock.52 There were no structures in
place to push the parties past impasse. Although less important
than other factors, time pressures may have further contributed to
the Czech/Slovak disunion.53
In broader perspective, the process that led to political divorce
was hardly a model of democratic deliberation. Public opinion was
not consulted through referendum. Opinion polls showed, however, that a majority of citizens in both the Czech and Slovak Republics wanted to preserve their state. Even after the division became final, polls showed that a majority in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia supported a unitary state.
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III. DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

Both Canada and the former Czechoslovakia have addressed separatist challenges without the substantial involvement of third parties. At times, however, external actors have been called upon to
mediate disputed separatist claims. There can be little doubt that
international mediators will continue to play a significant role in attempting to resolve such disputes." And so it is worth considering
whether insights derived from previous experiences, including
those of Canada, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia, can
enhance the effectiveness of international responses to separatist
claims.
Among the most significant recent instances of such mediation
was the EC's attempt (later joined by the United Nations) to foster
a peaceful resolution of conflicts surrounding separatist claims in
the former Yugoslavia. Its efforts proved to be stunningly ineffectual. But like any failure of this order, the European initiative merits consideration for the lessons it offers.
A. The Badinter Commission
The EC assumed the leading role in mediating territorial disputes
in the former Yugoslavia after the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared their respective independence on June 25, 1991. On
August 27, 1991, the EC and its member states agreed to convene
both a Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia and an Arbitration
Commission operating within the framework of that conference.56
The latter, known as the Badinter Commission after its chairman,
Robert Badinter, was established to help ensure "a peaceful accommodation of the conflicting aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples."57
By year's end, the commission would play a central role in implementing the EC's recognition policy for breakaway Yugoslav republics.
Of special interest here is the novel role that democratic principles played in the EC recognition process generally and in the work
of the Badinter Commission in particular. That process was established through two declarations adopted on December 16, 1991.
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The first, "Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,"5 s established a common policy governing recognition by the EC and its member states of new
states that might emerge from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. A separate Declaration on Yugoslavia`' added further preconditions for recognition with respect to the SFRY.
The EC policy represented a major innovation, establishing conditions for recognition of new states that went substantially beyond
the traditional international legal criteria for statehood."i0 Broadly,
candidates for recognition were defined as states that "have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in
good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations."6 ' As elaborated in the EC declarations, these criteria sought to ensure both
that issues arising from the transitions in the former Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia would be resolved through negotiations and that
the states that emerged through peaceful processes would guarantee respect for the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, with
special attention to the rights of minorities.
The Declaration on Yugoslavia established a process pursuant to
which Yugoslav republics seeking independence had to request
recognition by December 23, 1991. The Badinter Commission was
to take a decision by January 15, 1992.2 Under circumstances prevailing at that time, these requirements effectively forced Bosnia to
seek independence and to hold what proved to be a provocative
plebiscite. As noted earlier, Bosnia had no interest in seceding until
Croatia and Slovenia withdrew from the former Yugoslavia. Once
this happened, however, a majority of Bosnian citizens believed
they would enjoy greater security in an independent Bosnian state
than in a rump Yugoslavia.
By letter dated December 20, 1991, Bosnia requested EC recognition. In an opinion rendered on January 11, 1992,b the Badinter
Commission noted that although Bosnian authorities had made
the commitments required by the EC recognition policy, "the Serbian members of the [Bosnian] presidency did not associate themselves with those declarations and undertakings" and that Bosnian
Serbs had taken a number of measures to dissociate themselves
from the independent state whose recognition was sought. 4 The
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commission therefore concluded that "the will of the peoples of
Bosnia-Hercegovina to constitute the [Socialist Republic of BosniaHercegovina (SRBH)] as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established." 5
The commission suggested, however, that its assessment "could
be reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum
of all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried out
under international supervision."
Heeding this suggestion,
Bosnia held a referendum on March 29 through April 1, 1992.
Bosnian Serbs, who constituted 31 percent of the republic's population, boycotted the ballot. With a turnout of 63.4 percent, the
vote in favor of independence exceeded 99 percent. 7
Believing that recognition would help avert in Bosnia the kind
of violence that had been triggered by Croatia's declaration of independence, the EC and United States issued a joint statement on
March 10, 1992, expressing their willingness to recognize the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina. The EC issued a statement on
April 6 indicating its intention to recognize Bosnia the following
day, and on April 7 the United States issued a statement reflecting
the (first) Bush administration's belief that Bosnia, Croatia, and
Slovenia met "the requisite criteria for recognition."8 Recognition
by other countries quickly followed.
The results were disastrous. On April 6, 1992, in anticipation of
EC recognition the next day, Bosnian Serb rebels attacked the Holiday Inn of Sarajevo, signaling the onset of the armed conflict that
would ravage Bosnia for three and one-half years. Without a commitment to help defend Bosnia's borders militarily, Western recognition of Bosnia exacerbated rather than mitigated the risk of
armed conflict.
In effect, the EC recognition process forced Bosnia to seek
recognition under the gun. As noted, the declaration establishing
that process required Yugoslav republics seeking recognition to
apply within a week. The Badinter Commission precipitated another disastrous development when it suggested that Bosnia hold a
referendum. The EC's ill-considered deployment of democratic
processes was, proverbially, like pouring kerosene onto a fire. This
is not to suggest that the EC process was the principal or even a pri-
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mary cause of conflict in Bosnia. The question is whether a different strategy could have been more effective.
B. Lessons of the Badinter Commission
Key aspects of the EC's recognition policy, including opinions of
the Badinter Commission, were deservedly controversial. It may
therefore be tempting to dismiss this precedent as a manifest failure. But if the Badinter Commission was flawed,"9 the underlying
model of an intergovernmental institution that can assist in resolving disputed territorial claims may serve a useful role. 70
This is not to suggest, however, that states should create a new institution whose sole mandate is to mediate contested separatist
claims. The notion of such a body would be anathema to most
states confronting separatist challenges. States may be more inclined to utilize the services of an institution whose mandate is to
help mediate ethnic tensions broadly defined7 1 than to turn to a
body established to address separatist claims as such. Also, a more
broadly gauged approach would improve prospects for addressing
the concerns of ethnic minorities within the framework of existing
states rather than at a point when the logic of separation has become inexorable.72
Even so, more effective use should be made of processes in
which issues relating to recognition (or its functional equivalent)
cannot be sidestepped. Of particular relevance in this regard are
processes relating to new membership in intergovernmental organizations (IOs). Some IOs, including the European Union (EU)
and Council of Europe, already condition membership on applicant states' meeting basic standards relating to human rights and
democracy. 73 The EU and its precursor, the EC, have at times effectively used the accession process to encourage applicant states to
democratize and ensure minority rights.74 But the EU has neither
consistently used this leverage nor used it to maximum effect. 75
Ideally, more rigorous enforcement of rights-related preconditions to membership in IOs would induce established states to improve their treatment of minorities while creating an expectation
among secessionists that there would be a protracted period before
their claims for recognition might even be considered. 76 This
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might be especially useful in volatile situations, producing a cooling-off period during which mediators could attempt to head off secession by securing effective assurances of minority rights. After all,
grievances underlying separatist aspirations sometimes can be assuaged through effective assurances of group autonomy and other
minority rights.7 7
At the very least, intergovernmental institutions that include in
their membership criteria conditions relating to democratic principles and human rights, such as the EU, should treat these criteria
as seriously as other conditions of membership.78 Insistence on
such conditions is no guarantee that new member states will operate in accordance with democratic principles. But a political community that has already demonstrated respect for democratic values and human rights is surely a better risk than one that has done
no more than pledge to respect them.
If enforced wisely, this approach could make it possible to sidestep the vexing questions latent in the notion of a remedial right to
secede. In the view of one scholar, remedial secession is justified
only when "it is clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail." 79 Yet this proposed
test begs hard questions: How severe does a state's denial of participatory and other rights have to become before the victim group is
entitled to secede? How long must the repression persist before it
is "clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-determination"
would be futile? Whether a government satisfies international standards of political participation rarely lends itself to a straight up or
down determination; forecasting the future of a nation's democratic path is more perilous still.

CONCLUSION

Principles of self-government are scarcely the only considerations
that should guide responses to separatist claims. But they have recently assumed unprecedented relevance. In some circumstances,
they may weigh in favor of separatist claims. Still, international law's
deepening devotion to democracy remains what it has long beena commitment above all to full participatory rights within established states. Emerging norms recognizing a right to self-government lend support to separatist claims principally when those same
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norms have already been profoundly, irrevocably breached. And so
it is trite but useful to remind ourselves that the most successful policy toward secessionist movements is one that dampens separatist
aspirations-and that is implemented well before intrastate tensions reach the breaking point.
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